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Abstract 
By drawing on Norman Fairclough’s seminal study New Labour, new language?, this article sets out 
to address and overcome a problematic issue in a ‘Faircloughean’ CDA: the premise that discourse’s 
rhetorical orientation is geared towards the concealment of problematic ‘extra-discursive’ interests. 
This article proposes that ideological agents’ discourse can also be explored without a priori 
assigning dubious or concealed commitments and investments to these producers. Problematic 
interests, in this view, are not only something that discourse producers have and conceal, but also 
what they might anticipate being accused of having. Considering ‘stake’ and interest as a discursive 
concern rather than a cause for discourse initially grounds this proposition in a kind of ‘emic’ 
discourse-analytical endeavour. Yet, this article does not set out to argue against an ‘etic’ CDA, but 
seeks to provide an alternative to approaching projects for social change as discursive operations 
and sites of hegemonic struggle. 
Key words: Fairclough, New Labour, hegemonic struggle, rhetoric, discursive causes versus 
discursive concerns  
 
1. Introduction 
This article addresses and proposes a solution to overcoming a key issue in the 
branch of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) that explores the relationship 
between discourse and social change, and whose most influential architect and 
proponent is Norman Fairclough. In his vast body of work, Fairclough has set out an 
analytical framework for exploring how discourse features in projects for social 
change (Fairclough 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b, 2003) and he has applied that 
framework to projects he deems particularly characteristic of ‘late modernity’ 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999): the commodification of cultural and social life 
(Fairclough 1991, 1993, 1997), globalisation (Fairclough 2006), and the rise of ‘new 
capitalism’ and its colonisation of all spheres of economic, social and cultural life 
(Fairclough 2000b, 2002, 2004). In 2000, Fairclough published New Labour, new 
language? (Fairclough 2000a). This seminal study, despite being written in a ‘clear 
and non-technical style’ and having inspired and convinced a broad (non-academic) 
readership, is a prime application of a what I term a ‘Faircloughean’ CDA.  
In 1994, Tony Blair introduced the UK electorate to a ‘new’ Labour Party that 
embraced the ‘Third Way’ politics of ‘ideological transcendence’, a politics that set out 
to move ‘beyond left and right’ (Giddens 1994, 1998). Grounded in a conviction that a 
social democratic politics should be in tune with changes in the nature and 
requirements of modern times (Blair 1998), New Labour was to pursue a politics that 
would not depart from Labour values. Instead, according to the ‘Blairites’ in the 
party, Britain needed the now notorious adage of ‘Labour values in a modern setting.’ 
Taking an unequivocal stance against the righteousness of New Labour, Fairclough’s 
study (Fairclough 2000a) reveals how the language of New Labour, with a typical 
Third Way rhetoric as its core, is able to background what he considers its actual neo-
liberal political commitment. New Labour’s language thereby gradually normalises 
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an inherently problematic view of social life and government. With his focus on how 
language can construct and validate versions of the social world and on how it can 
progressively marginalise the validity of alternative and contesting versions, 
Fairclough provides wonderful insights into New Labour as foremost a discursive 
operation.  
Yet, Fairclough’s study highlights an issue pervasive in other (Faircloughean) critical 
language enquiries: the premise that discourse’s rhetorical orientation is geared 
towards the concealment of problematic ‘extra-discursive’ interests and 
commitments. This article proposes that we can actually explore the discourse of 
ideological agents like New Labour without a priori assigning concealed investments 
to the discourse producer. That is, we can consider discourse constructing particular 
versions of events for how it bears the traces of actively negotiating and refuting that 
such problematic interests are at play. Problematic interests or commitments, then, 
are not only something that discourse producers have and conceal, but also 
something they might anticipate being accused of having.  
Considering ‘stake’ and interest as discursive concerns rather causes for discourse (cf. 
Locke and Edwards 2003: 239) firmly grounds my proposition in discourse-
analytical endeavour that is typically referred to as ‘Discourse Analysis’. Labels like 
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ and ‘Discourse Analysis’ wrongly suggest that there are 
two kinds of discourse-analytical endeavour; a critical and a ‘non-critical’ variation. 
Moreover, these two strands have explicitly challenged each other on what discourse 
is to bear the traces of and on the influence of methodological and analytical 
frameworks in identifying these traces (cf. Wetherell 1998; Schegloff 1998; Billig 
1999a, 1999b; Schegloff 1999a, 1999b). However, I do not set out to argue against 
Fairclough at all, but seek to provide an alternative to approaching projects for social 
change as a discursive operation and a site for hegemonic struggle.  
To construe Fairclough’s view of rhetoric, sections 2 to 5 of this article set out 
characteristics of New Labour, new language? and, arguably, of a broader 
Faircloughean CDA: the argued salience of language in projects for social change; the 
view of discourse producers in these projects as ideological agents; the subsequent 
view of discourse production as inherently motivated, and the resulting task for the 
analyst to assess the veracity of rhetoric. The second part of the article, in sections 6 
to 8, suggests a reconsideration of this view of rhetoric and illustrates, by drawing on 
Tony Blair’s 2006 valedictory Labour party conference speech, how considering 
extra-discursive interests as discursive concerns still allows us to understand New 
Labour, just as Fairclough does, as a discursive project that attempts to normalise a 
(problematic!) particular view of social life and governance.    
 
2. The Salience of Language in Projects for Social Change 
Fairclough’s CDA is characteristic for its focus on exploring the role of discourse in 
particular programmes for social, economic and cultural change. These programmes 
account for fundamental (and problematic) changes in the way people live their lives, 
and are distinctively characteristic for how they exist ‘as discourses [original 
emphasis] as well as processes that are taking place outside discourse’ (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough 1999: 4). This claim highlights a particular view of the role of 
discourse – or language as Fairclough more commonly refers to it – in social 
practices.  
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In this light, Fairclough (2000a: 146-160) considers government as a social practice, 
as a principle that organises and defines a particular sphere of social life, the groups 
of people in it and their relationships to each other. What people do in the social 
practice of government, how they are organised by it, and what they believe in or 
through it is absolutely vital to its nature. Nonetheless, Fairclough (2000a: 156) 
considers language in all social practices of government a ‘durable’ feature because 
the social action of governing is inherently discursive in nature, as the significance of 
policies, documents and decision-making illustrates.  
Yet, language is more than a mere durable feature in New Labour’s social practice of 
government. It is a particularly ‘salient’ one (cf. Fairclough 2000a: 156-159), because 
the social action of New Labour’s governance is very much shaped by New Labour’s 
‘Third Way’ view of the state and civil society and by its ‘politics of reconciliation’, a 
politics postulating that the same means to enable and facilitate the pursuit of social 
enterprise could and should secure social justice. That salience would manifest itself 
in two dimensions of New Labour’s discourse. On the one hand, the Third Way vision 
entails an open, transparent and democratic style of government and a ‘firm-but-fair’ 
or managerial kind of leadership. Through the careful analysis of discursive genres, 
such as Green Papers, party manifestos and Tony Blair’s performances, Fairclough 
argues for the relative importance of semiotic practices in constructing and 
representing such a style. On the other hand, the Third Way vision entails a particular 
version of the world, one in which irreversible global change is necessitating a new 
kind of social democratic politics.  
Thereby, New Labour not only establishes an agreement that this is what the world is 
like, but also that New Labour’s political response to it is the most adequate and 
altruistic. That agreement is foremost to be the product of discursive representations 
of the world and New Labour’s politics, both of which are to be certified for their 
validity, factuality and veracity. And, again, typical genres like Green Papers, party 
manifestos and political speeches of Labour leaders and politicians are considered by 
Fairclough as highlighting how language is particularly salient in being constitutive of 
and constituted by these versions of the social world. It is this part of Fairclough’s 
analysis – and thus not his analyses of how discourse genres construct and 
reconstitute a particular style of governance and leadership (cf. Fairclough 2000a: 
95-140) – that forms the focus of this article’s assessment.   
 
3. Discourse Producers as Ideological Agents  
Fairclough’s concern with New Labour’s language is not merely because of its 
particular or relative importance in New Labour’s social practice. Instead, he is 
concerned about the consequences of that salience, as it results in the postulation and 
acceptance of a version of the social world he deems problematic and hazardous,  
My interest in the politics and language of New Labour starts from my view that it is 
profoundly dangerous for my fellow human beings for this new form of capitalism to 
develop unchecked, both because it dramatically increases inequality (and therefore 
injustice and suffering) and because it threatens to make life on earth unsustainable. 
(Fairclough 2000a: 15) 
An involvement with the topic under investigation is in line with the generic principle 
of critical language enquiry. Yet, Fairclough’s normative stance in relation to New 
Labour seems to move beyond analytical suspicion. His starting position is that New 
Labour’s discourse is inevitably to attempt a problematic kind of normalisation. This 
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is to be principally understood through his position in the academic response to New 
Labour. Fairclough is not a mere critical language analyst; his concerns about New 
Labour are also part of the broader ‘academic charge’ that New Labour abandoned 
Labour values and principles (cf. Hall,  1998; Hall, 2005; Callinicos, 2001).The 
duality of Fairclough’s academic identity becomes particularly manifest in his call for 
‘co-ordinated action against neo-liberalism on the part of critical language 
researchers’ (Fairclough, 2000c: 147) and his appeal for exposing the discourse of 
those social agents who play a key part in the construction and reproduction of the 
view that ‘all must bow to the logic of the global economy’ (Fairclough 2000c: 147).  
These two dimensions of Fairclough’s scholarship also evidently converge and 
overlap in New Labour, new language?. Fairclough a priori denounces any politics 
that accepts ‘international economic liberalism … as an inevitable and unquestionable 
fact of life upon which politics and government are to be premised’ (Fairclough 
2000a: 15) and which claims that the means to stimulate enterprise and global 
competition can simultaneously safeguard fairness and social justice (Fairclough 
2000a, 2002). He then explores New Labour’s language for how it must therefore 
bear the traces of juggling between having an inherently neo-liberal and (global) 
capitalist commitment and not wanting to lose traditional Labour support. This 
makes New Labour relevant as a neo-liberal agent that ‘seeks to achieve rhetorically 
what it cannot achieve in reality – a reconciliation of neo-liberal ‘enterprise’ with 
‘social justice’’ (Fairclough 2000a: 16).  
 
4. Discourse Production as Inherently Motivated 
New Labour would rhetorically achieve this reconciliation by working up what is a 
highly interested and distorted version of the social world – of the global changes, the 
role of government and nature of politics in it – as factual and disinterested. This 
view of language as being ideologically committed but concurrently presented as 
uncommitted can be seen to draw heavily on how prominent critical linguists, Robert 
Hodge and Gunther Kress (1988), have theorised the issues of modality and interest 
in the production of the sign.  
Central to their theorising is a social semiotic approach to social power, which 
challenges the Saussurean notion of the fixed and relatively arbitrary nature of how 
signifiers and signified together constitute the sign. Hodge and Kress (1988), being 
explicitly inspired by Vološinov (1973), argue for the instable relationship between 
signifier and signified and for the ‘non-arbitrary’ and motivated composition of the 
sign. A social semiotic approach sees social power as the effect of being ‘sanctioned 
with modality’, as being granted with controlling ‘what version of reality will be 
selected out as the valid version in [a] semiotic process’ (Hodge and Kress 1988: 45). 
That authority is the product of a broad consensus that the relationship between 
signifier and signified is transparent, that, for example, New Labour’s typical 
referring to ‘sweeping and irreversible global change’ describes the social worlds as it 
is.  
Hodge and Kress’ argument about modality therefore develops a social semiotic 
theory of ‘truth’. It sees the factuality and validity of the signifier as to be achieved 
discursively. How critical linguists account for social power by focusing on the 
sanctioning of modality is similar to Fairclough’s accounting for shifts in social power 
and for social change by focusing on how institutions or (ideological) agents colonise 
and consolidate the production and consumption of discourse. The emphasis in both 
5 
 
accounts is on accepting and supporting the way in which an agent makes sense of 
the social world. That support is translated into a broad agreement that the 
descriptions of the social world are representing that social world as it is.  
The consequent question is how social agents and institutions, or authors of 
discourses, can secure and consolidate an apparently transparent relationship 
between signifier and signified. Critical linguists pose this question to account for 
existing structures of social power, whilst Fairclough’s focus is on accounting for 
shifts in social power. Both argue that the workings of ideology are vital, as it has the 
capacity to background the question of whose interests are served by a specific 
portrayal of the social world. This is enabled by those linguistic transformative 
practices that attend to issues of agency, responsibility and interests (cf. Fowler et al. 
1979; Kress and Hodge 1993; Fairclough 1989, 1992a, 2000a). Language, then, is a 
‘social semiotic’ (Halliday 1978), capable of constructing particular social realities and 
of negotiating social order and social relationships within it.  
 
5. Assessing the Veracity of Rhetoric  
What de Saussure argued to be a fundamentally arbitrary relationship between 
signifier and signified is thus in fact a highly motivated one; not by resemblance to its 
referent but by the interests of either the discourse producers (e.g. New Labour) or 
key beneficiaries (e.g. multinationals, middle classes) in a particular version of the 
social world. Linguistic transformative practices and language as a general social 
semiotic allow for particular representations of the social world in which problematic 
agency, responsibility and interests can be managed. Thereby, the relationship 
between signifier and signified appears transparent, whilst it is in fact opaque or full 
of ‘ideological constitution and intention’ (Kress 1993: 90). This analytical suspicion 
of practices of discourse production has important consequences for what constitutes 
the perceived task but also the object for critical discourse analysts: they have a 
unique ability to recognise the social production of signs as inherently motivated and 
thereby suspicious (Kress 1993). Although CDA pursues an emancipatory project of 
critical language awareness, it is principally the analyst who spearheads such a 
project in providing a rare opportunity to see through practices of discourse 
production, avoiding inevitably drowning in them. This ability is captured in Simon 
Hoggart’s description on the back cover of Fairclough’s New Labour, new language,   
To those of us who find ourselves carried along helplessly in Tony Blair’s rhetorical 
stream of consciousness, Norman Fairclough offers a life-saving branch to which we 
can cling, while we work out where we are and where we are being swept. 
A first example of Fairclough’s treatment of New Labour’s discourse is a section of a 
1998 New Labour White Paper, entitled ‘Building the knowledge-driven economy’i 
(Fairclough 2000a: 23). The features Fairclough focuses on are underlined: 
In the increasingly global economy of today, we cannot compete in the old way. Capital 
is mobile, technology can migrate quickly and goods can be made in low cost countries 
and shipped to developed markets. British business must compete by exploiting 
capabilities which its competitors cannot easily match or imitate … knowledge, skills 
and creativity. 
Fairclough focuses on the grammatical and linguistic category of ‘processes’, the 
representation of actions. In relation to the representation of these underlined 
actions – the migration of technology, the production and shipping of goods – he 
questions why the White paper does not say instead that ‘the multinational 
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corporations can quickly move capital and technology from place to place, and they 
can make goods in low cost countries and ship them to developed markets’ 
(Fairclough 2000a: 24)? The absence of multinational organisations as a key social 
actor in these processes constructs these multinationals as ‘the ghost in the machine’ 
(Fairclough 2000a: 23). Fairclough argues that the effect of this backgrounding is 
that the global economy is presented as an undeniable feature of our lives that cannot 
be challenged or reversed.  
Even though Fairclough acknowledges that New Labour might in fact conceive of the 
global economy in this way, such a vague version of who is responsible for the global 
economy is also convenient for New Labour, allowing the party to ‘have it both ways’ 
(Fairclough 2000a: 24). If New Labour was to make the role of the multinationals 
more explicit and in line with their actuality by bringing it grammatically to the fore, 
the electorate would see through their ‘destructive, self-interested activities’ 
(Fairclough 2000a: 24). This would make it hard for New Labour, particularly among 
its leftist supporters, to create support for a new politics that prides sets out to take 
on the consequences of this global economy. 
A second example is Fairclough’s analysis of a section of Tony Blair’s 1998 pamphlet 
‘The Third Way’ii (Fairclough 2000a: 44). Again, the foci of Fairclough’s analysis are 
underlined. The italics are Fairclough’s own:    
My vision for the 21st century is of a popular politics reconciling themes which in the 
past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic – patriotism and internationalism; 
right and responsibilities; the promotion of enterprise and the attack on poverty and 
discrimination … In New Labour’s first year of government we have started to put the 
Third Way into practice. Cutting corporation tax to help business and introducing a 
minim wage to help the lowest paid. Financial independence for the Bank of England 
and the biggest ever programme to tackle structural unemployment. New investment 
and reform in our schools to give your people the skills they need and cracking down 
hard on juvenile crime to create secure communities … 
The focus is on how these ‘ands’ bring together different themes. New Labour would 
use such constructions often and in combination with each other, thereby creating a 
‘not only, but also’ logic (Fairclough 2000a: 44). This is of course symptomatic of 
New Labour’s politics of reconciliation and Fairclough argues that this is a typical 
feature of New Labour’s ‘Third Way rhetoric’. This characteristic generates discursive 
effects that make it a feature subject to Fairclough’s suspicion of being a motivated 
choice.  
The combinations are surprising to an audience because New Labour makes them 
initially relevant as each other’s mutually exclusive opposites and then goes on to 
negate that opposition. Moreover, because they are often presented, as they are here, 
through an overload of examples, they infer and persuade the public that paired-up 
themes are part of the same kinds of domains. For example, ‘responsibilities’ 
becomes vertically aligned with ‘attacking poverty and discrimination’, implying that 
they are both part of the more ‘social-ist’ dimension to New Labour’s politics, now to 
be reconciled with more liberal themes that are typically presented before the ‘and’.  
Fairclough (2000a: 45) treats these combinations with suspicion as ‘it is one thing to 
say that there may be ways of reconciling (…); it is quite another to say that the two 
‘themes’ can be no longer in conflict.’ In addition, they would create a sense of 
vertical similarity between themes that are not similar, as for example 
‘responsibilities’ in fact articulates a (neo-)liberal theme that has already colonised 
the sphere of social justice. The kind of ‘obscuring’ (Fairclough 2000: 45) that is 
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enabled by these combinations would allow New Labour to present its politics as not 
privileging any ideological tenet. Thereby, very similar to what we have seen in the 
example above, it enables New Labour to keep its different constituencies – its new 
middle-class electorate and its traditional supporters – on board (cf. Fairclough 
2000a: 25).  
Fairclough thus considers transformative practices and rhetorical devices in New 
Labour’s language as able to discursively accomplish both the inevitability of the 
global economy and change as well as the consequent necessity to respond to the 
effects rather than challenge the origins of these processes. He also regards them as 
capable of achieving the equivalence between unrelated themes or spheres of social 
life. These discursive practices are thereby capable of achieving the 
‘uninterestedness’ of New Labour. They enable New Labour to conceal its true 
political commitment of systematically favouring neo-liberal over socialist principles, 
of having fully embraced the global economy and the interests of its key initiators, 
and of breaching a key Labour principle by leaving structurally unchallenged the role 
of problematic actors in processes of global change.  
 
6. Rethinking Rhetorical Sophistication 
The verbs accomplishing and achieving are important here. They imply that the 
factuality of New Labour’s representations is ‘awarded’ to New Labour and that there 
is consensus over the fact that, for example, ‘sweeping’ global change has no agency 
and that it necessitates political attending to its effects. In other words, New Labour 
has been granted the modality to describe the social world – both in terms of the 
‘external’ world and of its own politics – as it is.  
However, what arises from Fairclough’s analysis is that because ideological agents 
have interests, and especially because they have a rhetorical capacity to make careful 
lexical and grammatical choices in backgrounding those interests, their 
representations have such an intrinsic ability to pre-empt their ‘exposure’ that 
sanctioning modality is inevitable. The authority to validly represent the social world, 
then, is not something that is sanctioned to New Labour through consent and 
accomplishment, but acquired by New Labour through ‘rhetorical coercion’.  
Instead of elaborating on what characterises the form and orientation of rhetoric, 
Fairclough implies that rhetoric is characteristic for how it accommodates two 
requirements: the discourse producer having problematic extra-discursive interests 
and the discourse producer having a sophisticated understanding of how linguistic 
and grammatical selection can pre-empt the exposure of those interests. Because 
none of the descriptions and accounts of New Labour can be brought back to its 
extra-discursive political agenda and commitment, New Labour is able to normalise 
its view of social life and governance. And here lies the crux: Fairclough is in the 
privileged position that he can expose.  
This, of course, highlights an issue in Fairclough’s work that has been subject to a 
much wider and ongoing debate between different streams of discourse-analytical 
endeavour over the role of the analyst and the status of analytical frameworks, a 
discussion I referred to earlier. In addition, Fairclough’s assessment of New Labour’s 
discourse production as inherently rhetorical stems from a problem that Jonathan 
Potter identifies in relation to a social semiotic theorisation of factuality and veracity, 
which he argues is ultimately ‘moral and normative’, treating some representations of 
events as ‘more real and more honest’ than others (Potter 1996: 226). Yet,  there is a 
8 
 
more pressing reason to propose an exploration of how pre-empting contestation 
could constitute a concern of New Labour’s discourse rather than its cause (cf. Locke 
and Edwards 2003: 239): Fairclough’s view of rhetoric is conditional. For example, if 
we were to argue that extra-discursive interest might not be potent or that witnessing 
the certification of the validity or factuality of descriptions might not necessarily 
illustrate practices of concealment, then discourse immediately loses its rhetorical 
nature and potential. In addition, New Labour’s language would be unable to attend 
to the struggle over the most appropriate and valid signifiers to describe the social 
world, including itself. However, the New Labour ‘project’ was/is notoriously 
controversial: despite a major increase in party membership after Blair becoming 
party leader, there were even more people – inside and outside the party – openly 
distancing themselves from the new political course.   
Therefore, even without assuming the extra-discursive interests of New Labour, its 
language might actually bear traces of practices that attend to certifying the validity 
of its claims. The kinds of devices and practices Fairclough identifies as pervasive in 
New Labour’s language – summing up-lists, an abundance of examples, the use of 
metaphorical language, the presentation of processes as entities – could equally be as 
orienting to the factuality of New Labour’s claims about the social world and about its 
own politics. Rather than necessarily highlighting practices of concealment, it could 
illustrate that the defining of New Labour is made relevant by discourse producers 
themselves as taking place in a context where New Labour’s accounts and 
descriptions might be subject to heavy contestation. 
 
7. From Concealing to Acknowledging 
This rethinking shifts the focus of pre-emptive discursive from concealing to 
acknowledging the contentious context in which discourse is produced. Such 
rethinking still regards discourse as rhetorical. Descriptions or accounts can say 
something about New Labour, but also about the appropriateness or validity of those 
descriptions and, thereby, about the validity of competing versions. Discourse, in 
addition, can still attend to the (ideological) struggle over the most appropriate 
signifier. The key difference is that the sanctioning of modality is not guaranteed by 
the force of rhetoric, but might be attempted when New Labour’s discourse is 
‘resilient against rhetorical onslaught’ (Edwards and Potter 1992: 152); when it 
consistently warrants that a potential problematic investment in descriptions of both 
the social world and itself is not an issue. This means that there is much more 
discursive work and effort to be carried out by the discourse producer.  It also entails 
a view of rhetoric as able to anticipate and manage projected discursive stake 
imputations rather than conceal actual extra-discursive interests. The key 
consequence of this conceptualisation is that rhetoric is characteristic for the shape 
and orientation of language; not – in the Faircloughean sense of the term – for its 
presupposing of problematic interests. 
As a starting point for considering ‘stake’ and interest as a discursive concern rather 
than cause for discourse (cf. Locke and Edwards 2003: 239), we can consider the 
work of rhetorical psychologist Michael Billig and discursive psychologists Jonathan 
Potter and Derek Edwards. Their work can be seen to draw on a Bakthinean view of 
discourse as dialogue, in which language only ‘means’ when speakers, interactionally, 
construct their social positions in relation to other social positions (Bakhthin 1981; 
Vološinov 1973) . The role of the analyst, according to Bakhtin, is to reconstruct how 
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the composition of utterance attends to ‘others’ and what it means in the context of 
how the speaker is engaged in a dialogue with those representing other positions.  
When I attribute this view to Bakhtin, I refer to a collective of ideas that could consist 
of the contribution of several individual authors, including Vološinov. Interestingly, 
Hodge and Kress (1988) firmly ground their theorising of the relationship between 
modality and social power in Vološinov’s work to argue for the diachronic nature of 
the sign. Yet, I would argue that especially Billig’s rhetorical approach to social 
psychology really brings to life Bakhtin’s idea of considering the utterance for its 
dialogical meaning and for its negotiation with other positions. He considers 
discourse not so much for how it can problematically seek to establish or safeguard 
the sanctioning of modality, but much more for how discourse bears the active traces 
of this struggle.   
Billig does so by regarding discourse in such ‘argumentative contexts’ as inherently 
rhetorical and thereby twofold in orientation (cf. Billig 1991: 181). It is rhetorical as it 
always seen to take a stance in two-pronged argument (Billig 1996), in which an 
argument for something is always an argument against something else. Consequently, 
discourse is intrinsically dual in orientation, as it simultaneously attempts the 
construction of particular versions of the social world, as well as the deflection of 
(anticipated) countering versions. What characterises discourse in argumentative 
contexts, then, is that it has ‘content as well as context’ (Billig  1991: 20). While a 
social semiotic theory of truth thus focuses on how discourse can achieve a 
normalised version of the social world, Billig’s ‘Bakhtinean scholarship’ emphasises 
the continuous challenges and fragility to such dominant views.  It sees the struggle 
over the most apt signifier as an endless battle, in which both dominant and 
challenging views are incessantly in negotiation.   
Billig’s distinction of discourse’s content and context can be seen to be further 
operationalised by discursive psychologists Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter’s 
distinction of discourse’s ‘action orientation’ and ‘epistemic orientation (Edwards and 
Potter 1992). They consider a central orientation of people’s talk and text, in which 
speakers typically attend to causal attribution, the management or anticipation of 
suspicious treatment. Participants are seen as potentially ‘caught in a dilemma of 
stake or interest’, in which their challenge is ‘to produce accounts … without being 
undermined as interested’ (Edwards and Potter 1992: 158). To manage that dilemma, 
participants try and warrant the factuality of their accounts.  
Consequently, a persistent occurrence of warranting practices is particularly likely to 
be displayed in those situations where people anticipate that their accounts might be 
treated by others as being informed by investment or stake in a particular social 
category. In such situations discourse producers can often be seen to make a special 
effort to certify the factual and stake-free nature of claims, descriptions, views and 
opinions that describe events and specify the roles of participants in those events in 
particular ways.  
 
8. Pictures of New Labour 
To illustrate this reconsideration of rhetoric, this section tentatively explores an 
extract of Tony Blair’s 2006 valedictory party conference speech for those kinds of 
pictures of New Labour it constructs that bear the traces of engaging in an argument 
with others over the most appropriate way(s) to define New Labour. That means that 
the analysis focuses on identifying those accounts, descriptions, claims and views in 
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the extract that are explicitly warranted for their ‘disinterestedness’, and that are 
hence able to present New Labour in a particular light.  
 
1. We changed the terms of political debate. This Labour government has been 
unique. 
2. First time ever two full terms, now three. So why and how?  
Raising the question (line 2) and presenting it as a legitimate and necessitated one is 
in itself an important practice of stake management. It implies that any discursive 
action is inherent to the question being asked: 
3. Because we faced out to the people, not in on ourselves. We put the party at the  
4. service of the country. Their reality became our reality; their worries our worries. We  
5. abandoned the ridiculous self-imposed dilemma between principle and power. We  
6. went back to first principles: our values, our real values. Those that are timeless, and  
7. separated them from doctrine and dogma that had been ravaged by time. And in 
doing  
8. so, we freed Britain at long last from the reactionary choice that dominated British  
9. politics for so long. Between individual prosperity and a caring society. We proved  
10. that economic efficiency and social justice are not opposites, but partners in 
progress.  
11. We defied conventional political wisdom, and thereby we changed it. 
I want to focus on how the categorisation of actions, attributed to the active ‘we’ 
agency, sets up a framework for comparison. The first reason Blair presents, ‘Because 
we faced ... in on ourselves’ (line 3), constitutes a blueprint for this. Blair recreates 
the effect of such a formula by including verbal actions and clauses that presuppose 
binary opposition: abandoning (versus sticking to), going back (versus moving away 
from) and separating (versus keeping together). Consequently, the framework against 
which the account is presented is one dominated by the binary opposites of 
abandoning, going back and separating. 
Using opposing verbs constructs a framework for comparison that makes available 
important inferences on the nature of the old framework. It is a framework in which 
the party faced in on itself (line 3); put the country at its service (lines 3-4); stuck to a 
‘ridiculous self-imposed dilemma between principle and power’ (lines 4-5), and in 
which it had moved away from its real values (line 6) because it could not make a 
distinction between values and ‘doctrine and dogma ... ravaged by time (line 7). These 
categorisations work up the elements of the old framework as typically problematic.  
Presenting an account as embedded within an adjacency pair enables attendance to 
the epistemic orientation of Blair’s claims. However, there are two other practices 
that similarly build up Blair’s account as disinterested. First, the only agency 
specified is the post-1994 Labour Party. The agent in the old framework is never 
made explicit. In addition to the occurrence of this ‘no-names’ practice, the behaviour 
of an agent is severely challenged without an explicit accusation being made. Blair 
does that by presenting the British political landscape as impacting upon all party 
politics. It is a landscape characterised by ‘reactionary choice’ (line 8) and by working 
within what, at the time, passed for ‘conventional political wisdom’ (line 11). 
Consequently, what ‘old’ Labour did was problematic, but not self-initiated. It thus 
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was defying (line 11) the root causes of Old Labour’s behaviour, as merely 
‘articulating’ the way things were done, rather than flouting Old Labour altogether, 
that is presented as the key difference between the old and new way of doing things:  
12. And around that we built a new political coalition. The USP of New Labour is  
13. aspiration and compassion reconciled. We reach out, not just to those in poverty or  
14. need, but those who are doing well but want to do better. Those on their way up,  
15. ambitious for themselves and their families. These are our people too. Not to be  
16. tolerated for electoral reasons but embraced out of political conviction. The core 
vote  
17. of this party today  is not the heartlands, the inner city, not any sectional interest or  
18. lobby; our core vote is the country [audience applauds]. And it was they who made 
us  
19. change. 
Important is the implied chronology in Blair’s account: it principally was defiance of 
what caused problems that resulted in the establishment of ‘a new political coalition’ 
(line 12). The way to overcome dogma and doctrine, as indicative of the effects of 
those root causes, is approaching politics as a coalition, as a partnership. Branding 
that new approach as a ‘unique selling point’, in which ‘aspiration and compassion 
[are] reconciled’ (line 13), specifies the new approach, but also, retrospectively, what 
that dogma and doctrine entailed: approaching politics in terms of either aspiration 
or compassion.  
In addition, Blair’s elaboration (lines 15-18) on his explicit countering of accusations 
made against New Labour (lines15-16) packages accusations against those who did 
‘filter’ on party eligibility. Blair equates such filtering with thinking in terms of the 
traditional Labour ‘heartlands’ (line 17), but also with thinking in terms of ‘sectional 
interest[s] or lobby’ (lines 17-18). However, these classifications have different 
connotations. Sectional interests and lobbies imply more than merely catering for a 
certain segment; they imply having disproportionate power. Making different issues 
relevant as part of the same category entails that any practice or filtering or selection 
is disturbing. Blair thus draws upon the refutation of an accusation against New 
Labour to problematise the practices New Labour is accused of. We could argue that 
this is an implicit ‘sneer’ at Old Labour’s dependency on trade unions. Yet, it is the 
explicit ‘distancing’ from sneering that warrants the veracity of Blair’s claim that the 
new additions to the traditional core vote are not being ‘tolerated for [mere] electoral 
reasons’ (lines 15-16). Consequently, an extra component is added to the chronology 
of New Labour’s establishment: it is the rejection of the implications of reactionary 
choice (electoral sectioning) that ultimately led to the defiance of that political 
wisdom (lines 18-19). We have seen how Blair has set out the implications of defying 
political wisdom as new rules and as new norms. Blair then goes on to extend this 
normative framework:  
20. The beliefs of the Labour Party of two-thousand-and-six should be recognisable 
to the  
21. members of nineteen-o-six. And they are: strong employment, strong public 
services,  
22. tackling poverty, international solidarity. But the policies shouldn’t  and the 
trouble  
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23. was, for a long time they were. In the nineteen-sixties, re-reading the Cabinet 
debates  
24. of ‘In Place of Strife’, everyone was telling Harold Wilson not to push it:  it was  
25. divisive, - unnecessary, - alienated core support. And in the end he gave up. But 
so  
26. did the public on Labour.  Even in nineteen-seventy-four, the Labour government 
had  
27. spent two years re-nationalising ship-building and the public spent two years  
28. wondering why. In the nineteen-eighties council house sales had first been 
suggested  
29. by Labour people. It was shelved: too difficult, too divisive. And we lost a  
30. generation of aspiring working-class people on the back of it. 
A new norm or rule is introduced: ‘The beliefs of ... the policies shouldn’t’ (lines 20-
22). That rule is not so much randomly initiated by Blair as it is motivated by the 
necessity to reject how things used to be done. But whereas the veracity of that 
necessity was earlier certified through outlining the typical problems associated with 
electoral sectioning, Blair now includes an explicit account of problematic moments 
in Old Labour’s history. This raises the question how Blair can make such an explicit 
accusation whilst avoiding that the attribution can be ascribed to a coloured or 
interested reconstruction of Old Labour? 
He does that by presenting the account from the focal perspective of someone who 
has access to the perspectives of both the Labour party and the British public. That 
access is warranted by Blair explicitly grounding his reconstruction of the reception 
of Harold Wilson’s white paperiii in official documentation on Cabinet debating this 
proposal (line 24). It serves as a blueprint for Blair’s subsequent account on how 
other Labour initiatives were perceived by both the Labour Party and the British 
public. That account includes two other instances in which Old Labour rejected policy 
proposals that would have been endorsed by the British public. The resulting list 
works up a trend of Old Labour dismissing certain proposals. It also  attends to three 
other important forms of causal attribution. First, election losses are attributed to the 
British public rejecting Old Labour’s dismissal of proposals. Second, given the 
established rule that the Labour Party should consider Britain as its core vote, the 
dismissed proposals should not have been rejected. Third, it implies that there was 
considerable overlap between what New Labour proposes and what ideas were 
rejected within Old Labour.  
The factual list attributes the implications of policies not being attuned to contextual 
dynamics to the party’s alienation from the British people, and to dogmatic party 
conventions. This certifies the factuality of Blair’s suggestion that stationary policies 
do not constitute legitimate grounds to claim a relationship of consistency and 
overlap between the Labour Party in 1906 and the Labour Party in 2006. In the final 
sequence of this section, Blair elaborates on what does constitute such legitimate 
grounds:  
31.  In the nineteen-eighties, we should have been the party transforming Britain. But 
we  
32. weren’t. And the lesson is always the same. Values unrelated to modern reality are 
33.  not just electorally hopeless; the values themselves become devalued. They’ve had 
no  
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34. purchase on the real world. We won in the end, not because we surrendered our  
35. values, but because we finally had the courage to be true to them [audience 
applauds].  
36. And our courage then in changing gave the British people, the courage to change.  
37. That’s how we won. 
Blair argues that a universal lesson can account for the implications of Old Labour 
structurally dismissing that policies should not be principally static: ‘[v]alues 
unrelated to ... the real world’ (lines 32-34). Presenting this commonsensical theme 
as ‘always the same’ (line 32) certifies its applicability to this specific situation. 
However, there is an apparent inconsistency here. Whereas Blair has challenged the 
idea of static policies, he is here clearly talking about the importance of flexible values 
(lines 32-33). But since he does not mean ‘beliefs’ (he earlier established them as 
timeless), he must refer to ‘policies’. Similarly, the reason why those policies were 
electorally hopeless was because they did not represent what the British public 
wanted. However, if the universal lesson applies, then it is values becoming devalued 
(line 33) and having ‘no purchase on the real world’ (lines 33-34) that accounts for 
electoral loss.  
This means that, in order to make the universal lesson ‘fit’, a few things have to be 
adapted. It implies that policies come to be equated with values, and that not doing 
what the public wants becomes associated with not relating to modern society and 
with devaluing party values. This ‘fitting’ process holds important implications for the 
actual accusation made at Old Labour: its electoral losses become attributed to the 
party having devalued Labour values. In accordance with this logic, New Labour’s 
electoral successes entail a revaluation of Labour’s values (lines 34-35).  
The section was occasioned by the invited question on what New Labour must have 
done differently to become an electoral success. That occasioning constitutes an 
important epistemic orientation to the sort of historical account Blair produces. 
However, the analysis has identified more instances of warranted causal attribution 
that can be seen to have bearings upon New Labour.  
First, Blair explicitly problematises Old Labour’s behaviour without ever holding 
them responsible for it. Instead, Old Labour’s behaviour is firmly framed in a political 
framework of reactionary choice and conventional political wisdom that affected all 
politics. It is the defiance of this framework that is constituted as the key thing that 
sets New Labour apart from Old Labour. Second, the old political framework of 
triggering reactionary choice and of posing restrictions on the sort of people a 
political party is to cater for constitutes New Labour’s widening of the electorate as a 
defiance of such politics. Third, the certification of the ‘rule’ that beliefs – rather than 
policies – that should be timeless defines New Labour’s electoral success as stemming 
from listening to the British people. It also defines New Labour’s policies as not 
coming ‘out of the blue’, but as grounded in decades of Labour ideas. Finally, New 
Labour’s ability to listen to the British people is attributed to the party’s revaluation 
of Labour values, in which loyalty to values has become equated with dynamic 
adapting and devaluation with static consistency.  
In sum, the attribution that Blair attempts here – problematising Old Labour and 
claiming that New Labour is attuned to true Labour values – is characterised by a 
pervasive orientation to warranting practices: discursive practices that attempt to 
refute any allegation that it is Blair’s investment in his social category that is ‘doing 
the talking’. Hence, Blair’s speech acknowledges these discursive consequences, 
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which are not successful by their sheer rhetorical force but by their ability to be 
‘resilient against rhetorical onslaught’, as the subject of contestation and challenging 
and as requiring particular ‘discursive veracity work’. And this is what hegemonic 
struggle in the Bakhtinean sense should entail: it should be about the active traces of 
struggle and of resisting challenge rather than about instances where rhetoric 
coercively sanctioned modality.   
 
9. Conclusion 
The conceptualisation of rhetoric proposed here examines discourses for how it bears 
the visible traces of an active struggle over the validity and disinterestedness of 
descriptions. This may appear incompatible with the critical discourse analyst 
needing to be ‘unabashedly normative’ (Van Dijk 1993: 253). After all, what about 
having an analytical suspicion towards ideological agents? And what about being 
concerned about how political projects contribute to and exacerbate social inequality? 
Focusing on how discourse producers attempt this sense of resilience against 
rhetorical onslaught – so, actively and visibly disabling anyone from reducing their 
discourse to problematic stake and interest – provides us with a fascinating platform 
for considering how discourse producers try and make acceptable that some 
representations are more valid than others. In this sense, it allows us to explore how 
language constructs particular versions, but particularly how it tries to create 
acceptance of that presentation and how it tries to settle scores with contesting 
voices. Such a consideration does not mean a break with the concern of CDA. If 
anything, it would allow us to consider, in even more detail, how language and 
ideology intersect.  
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